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 The fundamental claim of Ǯ)nternational Relations in the Prison of Political Scienceǯi is that we in IR have never fully realized the potential of our subject 
matter: the international dimension of the social world. Torn between a negative 
orthodox definition (as the absence of central authority) and a critical reaction 
which resists any essentializing of Ǯthe internationalǯ, we have never made the positive intellectual case for )Rǯs contribution to the wider social sciences. As a 
result, there is no IR equivalent to the big, trans-disciplinary ideas that have 
emerged over the decades from Geography, History, Sociology, Anthropology 
and Comparative Literature; and the intellectual standing of our field remains 
uncertain and vulnerable even while it attracts more students on more degree 
programmes than ever before. 
 
The article traces this peculiar situation to the enduring status of IR as a sub-field 
of Political Science. But it devotes most of its energy to the question of how the Ǯprisonǯ can be breached. The means, it suggests, are ready to hand. For the 
universal fact that human social development is not unitary but multiple is 
fraught with consequences for social reality. On the one hand, multiplicity entails 
the existence of a many-sided inter-societal domain which cannot be fully 
comprehended by theories drawn from the analysis of Ǯsocietyǯ in the singular; 
and on the other hand, this same universal fact plays a deep and continuous role 
in the internal constitution of domestic societies themselves, extending the 
significance of the international into the subject matter of the other social 
sciences and humanities. At the deepest level, therefore, multiplicity is for IR 
what space is for Geography, time for History, culture for Anthropology, power 
for Political Science and so on: it is the ontological premise for a specialized field 
of study which nonetheless has general significance for social analysis of all 
kinds. What is truly remarkable is that this premise has remained largely 
unactivated within IR itself. Even Realism has allowed its implications to remain 
imprisoned in the political sphere and (especially in its neorealist variant) has 
not explored its impact beyond the external relations of states and societies. 
Outside Realism, meanwhile, it is hard to think of a single branch of IR theory 
that comprises international theory in this sense: namely that it reasons from the 
fact of the international as a fundamental dimension of the social world. Little 
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wonder then that IR has played such a meager role in the conversation of the 
modern social sciences: by our own account, we have so little of our own to say. 
 
It is this unhappy assumption, finally, that the article seeks to overturn. First, it enumerates five general Ǯconsequences of multiplicityǯ which outline the 
significance of the international for social reality. Together, these form the 
general warrant for a discipline of IR that extends beyond the subject matter of  
Political Science. On this widened terrain, Realism is joined by a second 
international theory – Leon Trotskyǯs idea of uneven and combined development 
(UCD). Trotskyǯs idea already operationalizes the consequences of multiplicity 
much more fully than does Realism, but it by no means exhausts their potential. 
Just as the works of, say, Robert Sack, Edward Soja, Doreen Massey and David 
Harvey in Geography have unfurled the significance of spatiality in different 
directions and different registers, so too the significance of the international 
bears – and indeed requires – treatment in a variety of idioms and across 
numerous varied issue areas. The realization that such a development still lies ahead of us gives reason to hope that we are living not at Ǯthe end of )R theoryǯii 
but rather at its beginning. 
 
I am grateful to the five contributors to the present forum for their highly 
challenging but generous-spirited criticisms of this argument. They have set high 
standards, and I shall do my best to live up to these in what follows. If there is a 
common thread to our varied engagements, it lies, perhaps inevitably, in the 
question of the international itself: what it means, how to conceptualise it, and 
what other pitfalls, apart from the prison of Political Science, we must avoid in 
our attempts to do it justice. If we do not find agreement on this question, at least 
our debate may serve to bring it out into the open, where it surely belongs. 
 
 
1. Levels of Theory 
 )t will come as no surprise that ) find much to agree with in Stephen Brooksǯ 
response. For if Brooksǯ goal is to limit the role of Ǯgrand theoryǯ, his purpose 
therein is nonetheless to liberate it to play in IR the vital role that it has for every 
discipline. In this Merton-inspired view, grand theories provide the orienting 
assumptions within a given field: they tell us what phenomena to look for; they 
offer models of how these phenomena may be connected; and they facilitate 
cumulative knowledge production by linking concepts and assumptions in a 
systematic way. But grand theories can never themselves do the work of empirical explanation. This task falls to the Ǯmiddle-range theoriesǯ that they 
generate, and that deploy more specific hypotheses about actual historical 
events and phenomena. Thus the two types of theory need each other. It is the 
organizing and clarifying role of grand theory that enables middle-range work to 
be both clear about its underlying assumptions and cumulative in its intellectual 
consequences. Grand theories, meanwhile, if not directed into the production of 
middle-range hypotheses, would turn all their fire on each other in a pointless ȋbecause undecidableȌ battle to become ǮKing of the (illǯ – the single general 
theory that best explains everything. For Brooks, IR theory has always struggled 
to maintain the proper balance between these two. In the postwar decades, 
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grand theorizing absorbed most of its energies; since 2000, however, the 
emphasis has been, perhaps excessively, on hypothesis-testing, at the expense of more encompassing analyses. Thus Brooksǯ response to my article is a cautious 
welcome: we do need more grand theory in IR today, but only so long as this 
does not mean an attempt to establish the grand theory of UCD as ǮKing of the (illǯ. 
 
I agree. Indeed, I too distinguished two different levels of theory: a general claim about multiplicity as the basis of )Rǯs distinctive subject matter, and the 
particular approaches (such as Realism or UCD) which could then be fielded to explore this subject matter. And yet a momentǯs reflection reveals that Brooks 
and I are not talking about exactly the same thing. For him, approaches like 
Realism and UCD already are the grand theories which generate and organize the 
middle-range hypotheses that compete to explain international phenomena.iii 
There is no further level of IR-specific theory above them. In my argument, by 
contrast, they are the lower-lying models that populate a field defined by a yet Ǯgranderǯ )R claim about human life in general – that it is profoundly shaped by 
the fact of societal multiplicity. Our models thus overlap, but from different 
directions. Why is this difference important? 
 First, it is this Ǯgranderǯ level of theorization – not visible in Brooksǯ model – which specifies )Rǯs distinctive contribution to social theory. Our focus on 
societal multiplicity as a dimension of the human world both distinguishes us 
among the social sciences and connects us to their common preoccupation – the 
analysis of social reality. Consequently, this is also the level at which the international can be most easily posed outside the Ǯprison of Political Scienceǯ, 
because here alone it is evident that the consequences of multiplicity extend 
much wider than the domain of politics, and much deeper than the external 
relations of societies. If so, then Brooksǯ two-level model of theory in IR does not 
reach to the kind of theorizing we need in order to solve the problem raised in 
my article. In order to track down the international, we need the third level. 
 Second, once the Ǯlevelsǯ of )R theory are re-visioned through the addition of this third, Ǯontologicalǯ, level, our narrative of the disciplineǯs evolution changes too. 
Brooks describes an early over-emphasis on grand theory followed by a sharp 
decline which needs compensation – but not the introduction of fundamentally 
new elements. On my reading, by contrast, there is a crucial, discipline-defining moment of Ǯgrander theoryǯ that has simply never happened in )R. All the 
foundational statements I can think of have been formulated at level two, and inside the prison of Political Science. They have asked Ǯwhat is international 
politics as a subset of politics in general?ǯ rather than Ǯwhat is the international as a dimension of the social world?ǯ. We can observe this even in the mainstream disciplineǯs narrative of its own development via a series of Ǯgreat debatesǯ. 
Whether or not this narrative is historically accurate, it is striking that none of these supposed Ǯgreat debatesǯ has engaged the ontology of the international in general; what has rather been at issue has been either ȋas in the Ǯfirst great debateǯȌ its implications for politics, or (in all the others) the epistemological 
question of how the production of knowledge about it should proceed. Where, one might ask, is the Ǯgreat debateǯ about what the international actually is? 
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Third, it is this alternative narrative that in turn explains why ideas have not 
travelled from IR to other disciplines. If, as Brooks suggests, postwar IR was 
amply stocked with all the grand theory it needed, this inter-disciplinary silence 
would be difficult to explain. And yet it makes sense once we observe that )Rǯs 
questions about the international have simply not been posed at a high enough 
level for its relevance to the subject matter of other disciplines to be visible. For this problem, Mertonǯs ideas do not seem to provide a solution. 
 
 
2. Locations of Theory 
 )f Brooksǯ main concern is to closely circumscribe the role and definition of 
(grand) theory, Laura Shepherd takes almost the opposite view. For she suggests 
that my argument suffers from a too restrictive definition of what IR theory is, 
and who are its practitioners. I have assumed that it is a contemplative activity 
carried out by trained academics whose ideas fit neatly into the disciplinary Ǯismsǯ which in turn are summarized in the pages of )R textbooks. )n fact, 
however, not only does this Ǯismsǯ framework obscure those forms of theory that 
cannot be fitted into one or another of its classifications; it also neglects all the 
ways in which the praxis of conscious human subjects is itself a form of 
embodied theory – and by far the greatest part of the total theoretical activity 
that occurs in the human world. Had I looked to this wider resource, I would 
have found that pragmatic theorizations of the international as the consequences 
of societal multiplicity are not lacking at all: they are, for example, the very marrow of the praxis of activist campaigners for womenǯs rights who routinely 
navigate and engage a world shaped by societal multiplicity. 
 
Three points, then, need to be answered here: my reliance on textbook accounts 
of IR theory; my use of the Ǯismsǯ framework for describing the field; and my 
exclusion of the practical theorizing of engaged subjects. Let me take each in 
turn. 
 
Actually, my reliance on IR textbooks was rather slight – four citations out of 
more than ninety. Only twice did I cite International Relations Theories: Discipline 
and Diversity. And even then, it was not the authority of the textbook that I was relying upon. After all, if a sleepy Ǯover-simplifyingǯ ȋʹȌ textbook writer tells me 
that a leading critical approach to )R is Ǯnot a model or theory of international relationsǯ,iv I might well disregard the claim. But if these same words are used by 
David Campbell about post-structuralism, then I sit up and take notice, and I 
certainly do not discount them simply because they feature in a textbook 
chapter. 
 
That said, I wish I had made more use of textbooks to support my argument. For as Shepherd says, Ǯthe purpose of… textbooks is to generalize, consolidate, and make accessibleǯ the contents and shape of a given field. Their task is precisely to 
provide an overview so that we can see how that field constitutes itself. It follows 
that the absence of a positive theoretical conception of the international here 
would be even more significant than its neglect in the original writings of 
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individual scholars. And – remarkably – it is absent here. Textbooks in Political 
Science (or Geography or Gender Studies) routinely begin with the claim that 
there is a political (or spatial or gendered) dimension to just about everything. 
But where is the equivalent claim in IR? Even International Relations Theories 
spends most of its pages on approaches that instead bring ideas from elsewhere 
to bear on the analysis of international affairs. The inverse procedure of 
elaborating the implications of the international for other fields of study does not 
appear – not in the Preface ȋwhere the Editors lay out the seven Ǯthematicsǯ which compose the Ǯrationale for the bookǯȌ, not in the )ntroduction ȋeven though 
it includes a sub-section on Ǯwhat do the theories share?ǯȌ and not in the fifteen 
substantive chapters which provide the detailed expert survey of IR as a field of 
theoretical debate. And I mean no criticism of this excellent textbook: for in this 
regard it accurately represents the intellectual posture of the discipline as a 
whole. 
 Shepherdǯs second criticism is that my depiction of the field as a collection of Ǯismsǯ leads me Ǯto overlook the spaces between the neatly bounded packages of disciplinary knowledgeǯ ȋ͵Ȍ – the spaces in which real people and their lived 
experiences reside. This must be true. There is surely no such thing as a person whose identity and experience are entirely captured by Ǯrealismǯ, ǮMarxismǯ or even ǮFeminismǯ. These Ǯismsǯ are indeed abstractions designed to capture 
shared currents of thought and practice. They are therefore necessarily both 
partial and restrictive. And yet we all need abstractions of this kind – without 
their generalizing role, we would face an indescribable field in which there were 
as many approaches as there are people on the planet. Shepherd herself seems (I think rightlyȌ comfortable with invoking Ǯismsǯ in this sense – as when she refers to the contribution that specifically Ǯfeminist insightsǯ  ȋ͵Ȍ can make to thinking about theory. ȋǮFeminist, after all, presupposes Ǯfeminismǯ.Ȍ Moreover, while all Ǯismsǯ are indeed limited, they are not necessarily limited to a conservative intellectual politics, as Shepherd seems to imply: becoming an Ǯismǯ is a key 
means by which radical new approaches too stake their claim to general 
significance, their right to a recognized voice of their own in intellectual debate. 
Feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, queer theory – these are not 
bloodless abstractions but demands for particular viewpoints to be recognized 
as important, coherent perspectives on social reality. In short, it is neither possible nor even desirable for us to avoid Ǯismsǯ when engaging with fields of 
debate. But if – as I found in my survey of non-Realist IR theories – the Ǯismsǯ in a 
given discipline do not draw their claims from what is distinctive in its subject 
matter, this does tell us something important: namely that the intellectual 
emergence and self–definition of that discipline is in some crucial way 
unfinished. 
 
But perhaps I am still looking in the wrong place for the international theory I seek? This is Shepherdǯs third criticism: that ) have neglected the theoretical 
practice of engaged activists. There does at first appear to be a real egalitarian 
appeal to the claim that as conscious human subjects Ǯwe are all theoristsǯ ȋ͵Ȍ. )t 
also implies the happy thought that there exists a vast reservoir of international 
theory that we can access if only we give up our elitist assumptions about what 
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theory is. Yet claims like these bring difficulties too, which can readily be seen in 
the present case.  
 
The problem we face in IR is not that people (in all walks of life) cannot be seen 
to engage on a daily basis with the fact of the international. As I noted in the article, Ǯall the social sciences and humanities encounter the results of this fact, 
just as IR encounters the significance of spatiality, textuality and so on in its own subject matterǯ ȋͻȌ. The problem is rather that ȋunlike Geography, Comparative 
Literature and so on) IR has produced no explicit positive theorization of what 
the international is – a circumstance that simultaneously deprives IR of its 
intellectual confidence and leaves all the other disciplines to wrestle, apparently 
endlessly, with the fallacies of internalism, methodological nationalism and 
unilinear thinking. This problem is simply not addressed by saying that we are 
all practical theorists of the international – any more than it would help to say 
that we are theorists of space because we observe a spatial order in our daily 
lives, or theorists of capitalism because we routinely navigate (or even contest) 
its social relations. Humans have been living with and engaging the 
consequences of multiplicity for many centuries; and yet the lack of an explicit 
theorisation of this condition has endured well into the era of the modern social 
sciences (however brilliantly all kinds of thinkers have analysed its effects on 
numerous aspects  of social life). Among all the modern disciplines, IR is surely 
the one in which we would expect this problem to have been identified and 
overcome. If it has not been, that suggests to me not that IR is uniquely elitist, but 
rather that we have run into some special difficulty in this case.  There must be a 
reason why, as Kenneth Waltz once put it, Ǯ[s]tudents of international politics 
have had an extraordinarily difficult time casting their subject in theoretical termsǯ.v Arguably this reason has two parts: one is the exceptionally deep hold 
that internalist forms of reasoning have on our ways of thinking (what Martin Wight called Ǯthe intellectual prejudice imposed by the sovereign stateǯȌ;vi but the 
other is the unfinished emergence of IR as the academic discipline that should be 
providing the means to counter this prejudice. And that latter incompleteness 
can ultimately be solved only at the level where it obtains: the level of formal 
theory. 
 
Finally, the claim that Ǯwe are all theoristsǯ is, on closer inspection, politically 
double-edged too. For the list of those whose praxis engages the international 
extends well beyond those – like campaigners for womenǯs rights – whose political goals we approve. )t includes not only all the worldǯs states, but also 
arms dealers, multinational corporations, anti-immigration campaigners, international terrorists and extreme nationalists of all kinds. )f Ǯwe theorize… about how to make a cup of tea, or avoid traffic on our daily commuteǯ ȋ͵Ȍ, we 
surely cannot deny the title of international theorist to all these agents who, no 
less than the feminist campaigners, must navigate the consequences of 
multiplicity if they are to achieve their ends. On normative as well as cognitive 
grounds, therefore, an appeal to embodied theory seems unlikely to provide a 
solution. 
 
All in all, I welcome Shepherdǯs move to Ǯcomplicate the image presented of )nternational Relations theoryǯ ȋͳȌ in my article; ) accept her judgments that 
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textbooks involve a politics of representation, that Ǯismsǯ can oversimplify, and that in some sense Ǯwe are all theoristsǯ. But do these complications address the 
basic problem that IR has a lopsided relationship with the other disciplines 
because it has not yet taken full possession of its own subject matter? Of this I 
remain uncertain. 
 
 
3. Disciplines of Theory 
 
For Patrick Jackson, however, this Ǯbasic problemǯ is no cause for concern in the 
first place. On the contrary, he questions both the need and the wisdom of any 
attempt to define IR too closely as a discipline. Academic fields, he suggests, do 
not need to have a unique and stable Ǯpoint of viewǯ from which to examine the 
world. Indeed, viewed over time, all the major established disciplines can be seen to undergo continuous debate about their intellectual practice: Ǯrealist vs 
constructivist, nomothetic vs ideographic, positive vs critical, and the likeǯ ȋʹȌ. 
Furthermore, responding to this ferment by making ontological claims about our subject matter brings a triple danger of setting Ǯfundamental boundaries on subsequent enquiryǯ, of Ǯdisciplining international studies writ large into )nternational Relationsǯ and even of excluding other voices by Ǯdetermining what 
isn’t appropriate for generating knowledgeǯ of international affairs ȋ͵Ȍ. )n the face of these dangers, is it not better to rest content with )R as Ǯa meeting place 
for a variety of intellectual disciplines around a common concern with international affairsǯ ȋ͵Ȍ? We do not want, after all, to replace the prison of 
Political Science with a no less restrictive one of our own making in IR.  
 
Well, amen to that last sentiment – but should we then just leave things as they 
are? As already indicated, my own grounds for concern are wider than Jackson suggests. )t is not simply that Ǯpoor )R has nothing to call its ownǯ (1) (though this 
is a complaint that has been raised by a long line of thinkers from Stanley 
Hoffman, Fred Halliday and Chris Brown to Barry Buzan, Richard Little and the contributors to EJ)Rǯs ǮThe End of Theory?ǯ special issueȌ.vii There is also an IR-
shaped hole in the lingua franca of social theory, and it is arguably in everyoneǯs 
interest that it should be filled. 
 
But is Jackson nonetheless right to suggest that this problem cannot and should 
not be addressed by exercises in disciplinary definition? Let us examine his 
reasoning. His first step is to claim that academic fields or disciplines get along fine without having any stable Ǯpoint of viewǯ; viewed historically, they turn out 
to be continuously changing their vantage points as first one approach and then another gains the upper hand. But Jacksonǯs examples – realist vs constructionist 
etc. – are not so much about the object of disciplinary focus as about the changing 
ways of studying it. Do these objects – at a deeper level – really change so wildly? 
Was Political Science ever not grounded fundamentally in the study of power? 
Has spatiality ever proven to be just a passing interest of Geography? Jackson raises the extra example of Economics, noting that assumptions about Ǯhow economists thoughtǯ have altered sharply and repeatedly over time. But what 
surely does not change across all the iterations he mentions is the underlying 
feature of social reality on which the discipline of Economics (and Political 
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Economy) subtends: namely that all human societies subsist materially through 
organized processes of production and exchange. Is this not the unique (if often 
tacit) premise of Economics as a discipline? And can we even think of academic fields that are not in the end Ǯaboutǯ one particular aspect of reality rather than 
others?  
 
If not, then the issue is no longer whether disciplines have stable cores; it is rather what to do about them. And Jacksonǯs second step is to caution against 
turning them into ontological claims because this risks drawing the boundaries 
of the subject too tightly. What happens next is therefore something of a 
surprise.  
 
Jackson proposes that we should give up the notion of IR as a discipline in favour of Ǯinternational studies as a meeting-place for a variety of academic disciplines 
around a common concern with international affairsǯ ȋ͵Ȍ. ) am not sure why 
these other Ǯdisciplinesǯ are not also to be dissolved by the same logic – what do 
they have that IR does not? But the key point is that Jackson then offers a 
definition of the international as Ǯthe encounter with difference across boundariesǯ ȋ͵-4). This is an attractive definition. But I cannot help noticing that 
it does involve defining the content of an academic field in relation to a particular 
feature of social reality (i.e. ontologically). What is more, even though Jackson is reaching for Ǯthe broadest possibleǯ ȋͶȌ definition so as to avoid Ǯdefining anyone 
or anything out of )Rǯ ȋͶȌ, his choice is actually tighter and more restrictive than 
my own premise of societal multiplicity. Not all aspects of the international are 
rooted in difference. Some – like the security dilemma – derive from the simple 
fact that societies co-exist with others, irrespective of whether those others are qualitatively different in some way. A large part of Kenneth Waltzǯs intellectual 
career was built on the analysis of international logics deriving from the 
sameness of all states. We might disagree with his analysis, but we would 
presumably not want to exclude him from our definition of international theory. 
There is an obvious solution here – namely that we widen our definition to Ǯsocietal multiplicityǯ. But Jackson resists this: 
 …simple multiplicity isnǯt sufficient, in my view; after all, there could be multiple 
human groups existing in relative isolation, and whether those groups even 
encounter one another and interact sufficiently to have an important impact on one another is, in the end, an empirical question… ȋͶȌ 
 This strikes me as a huge and quite unnecessary concession to Ǯthe intellectual 
prejudice imposed by the sovereign stateǯ. The empirical consensus of World 
Historians is that such free-standing social groups have never actually existed 
except in freakish, temporary circumstances. And to hold open – even as a 
thought experiment – the possibility that they could hypothetically exist is to 
drastically undersell the significance of the international as a universal 
dimension of social being. 
 Jacksonǯs laudable goal is to avoid replacing the Ǯprison of Political Scienceǯ with 
a prison of IR. Yet these are not equivalents. As his own reflections demonstrate, 
all fields of study have to be delimited, whether or not we call them disciplines. But the Ǯprison of Political Scienceǯ is something different from this. For )R, the 
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sentence it imposes is not exclusion but confinement. Receiving visitors – being a 
meeting place for other disciplines – certainly means some relief from an 
exclusively political definition of the international. But so long as we remain 
confined – so long as we have not posed the international in a way that reveals 
its significance for the social world in general – the traffic seems destined to 
remain one-way. And I cannot shake off the feeling that our subject matter 
warrants more than that. 
 
 
4. Ideologies of Theory 
 
In the most radical of all four responses, David Blaney and Arlene Tickner contest the whole idea that )R has been trapped inside a Ǯprison of Political Scienceǯ, or that it can be released simply by taking on an intellectual problematic of multiplicity. The standard ǮAberystwyth narrativeǯ ȋͶȌ of )Rǯs 
interwar origins, they argue, conveniently suppresses the darker history of the 
discipline. Long forgotten but recently disinterred, this history shows that IR was 
from the start already preoccupied with the cultural multiplicity of the world, 
which it resolved into a shameless hierarchy of racial and colonial domination. In 
this regard, IR had already found its special place among the modern sciences, all 
of which had emerged partly in reaction to the world of cultural difference 
encountered by Europe in the course of its rise to global dominance. This 
reaction shaped the division of labour among the disciplines (for example, 
separating Sociology as the study of modern societies from Anthropology as the 
study of primitives); and it also bequeathed them a common ideological device: the idea of Ǯdevelopmentǯ through which the spatial Ǯpluri-verseǯ of difference 
was re-ordered into a temporal Ǯuni-verseǯ of the same, with all societies positioned as Ǯadvancedǯ or Ǯbackwardǯ on a single ladder of development. Thus, not only does my embrace of Ǯthe Aberystwyth narrativeǯ obscure the real history of )Rǯs engagement with multiplicity; even worse, my proposed solution – Ǯuneven and combined developmentǯ – reinstates the foundational category on 
which rests the real prison we need to escape: the prison of colonial modernity. 
This is a powerful set of charges indeed. What can I say in reply? 
 
Let me begin by noting some areas of large, if half-hidden, agreement. Although Blaney and Tickner set out to challenge my Ǯorigins storyǯ, their own version 
turns out to share almost all the essential details. For them too, IR was allocated 
a residual slot in the modern division of labour among the disciplines. It was 
shaped by the consolidation of Political Science as the study of modern 
government, which in turn generated an image of the international in terms of a 
dangerous lack of government (6). Thus we share the idea that IR was formed 
inside the problematic of Political Science, but in negative terms. Our two prisons 
may turn out to be one and the same.  
 Moreover, we also share the idea that )R Ǯoughtǯ to be based on the recognition of 
human life as manifold and co-existing rather than homogeneous and 
hierarchical. Thus when Blaney and Tickner say that multiplicity cannot be the answer ȋbecause )Rǯs history shows that multiplicity can be constructed in racist 
and hierarchical ways), what they really mean is that we need to embrace a 
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positive conception of multiplicity as legitimate difference: Ǯattention to 
multiplicity requires releasing )R from the prison of colonial modernityǯ ȋ͹Ȍ. 
 
And finally, I believe we also share a common intellectual challenge: how to 
grasp the human world as simultaneously multiple and yet – by virtue of its 
interconnections – making up a single whole. Blaney and Tickner worry that this 
brings the danger of lapsing into imagining Ǯa singular world or uni-verseǯ ȋ͹Ȍ, and they propose instead Ǯthe alternative and ultimately more radical 
possibilities posed by a pluri-verse of many different worldsǯ ȋͺȌ. But in the end, 
the stubbornly singular noun – Ǯa pluri-verseǯ – shows that the challenge has not 
gone away. Even the many worlds of difference ultimately comprise one world – a particular configuration of human societies and their interrelations. ǮUneven 
and combined developmentǯ is one response to this challenge. And ) do wonder 
whether – once its inner meaning has been brought out below – it might not turn 
out to be a response that we share, albeit in different languages. 
 
Before developing this argument, however, there is a further point to be made 
about the prison of colonial modernity. It is by now a matter of open historical 
record that all the modern human sciences were formed in the era of colonial 
empires, and that all of them evolved in ways that reproduced that world as well 
as reflecting it. The recent extension of this record to include what later became 
the discipline of IR is indeed a salutary and necessary development. But exactly 
how does this bear upon the question of how we should define the vocation of IR 
today?  
 As Blaney and Tickner note, Anthropologyǯs original allocation – Ǯthe savage slotǯ – was even more unpromising than )Rǯs. And yet Ǯacademic disciplines have 
transformed over time, transgressing the boundaries laid down in the modern eraǯ ȋ͸Ȍ. Anthropology did this not only by decolonizing its categories; it also embraced Ǯcultureǯ as a universal analytic and applied it critically to the study of Ǯcivilizedǯ Western societies as well. ȋSociologists too discovered long ago that in order to realize the promise of Ǯthe Sociological imaginationǯ they would have to 
break out of the analysis of modern Western social structures alone and to 
produce a fully historical and comparative field of study.)viii  
 
Thus while we must be attentive to all the ways in which colonial tropes remain Ǯsubliminally presentǯ ȋ͸Ȍ in )R discourses, this is only half the task before us; it 
should not prevent us from elaborating the positive vocation of IR as the study of 
societal multiplicity and its consequences; and this study in turn needs to extend 
far beyond specifically colonial forms of co-existence and interaction, for the 
simple reason that not all inter-societal relations in history have this form. The 
problem of an IR discourse that suppresses hierarchical North-South relations 
cannot be fully solved by adopting a (post-colonial) discourse that sees only those. Just as Anthropology needs the ontological premise of Ǯcultureǯ in order to 
explore the variety of human cultures, whatever their individual forms, so too IR 
needs the idea of multiplicity as the fundamental fact about the world that is 
presupposed by all international relations, colonial or otherwise. But here too, I 
suspect we agree. 
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Nonetheless, there remains that fly in the ointment: uneven and combined 
development. After everything we know about the insidious role played by the concept of Ǯdevelopmentǯ, how can ) advocate an intellectual formula that 
restores it to such a central position? 
 
Let me begin with a counter-question. At the start of their contribution, Blaney and Tickner cite a recent work by Alex Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu: How the 
West Came to Rule.ix They do so, ) think, to support their claim that Marxism Ǯhas 
largely reproduced the Eurocentrism of the fieldǯ ȋʹȌ. And How the West Came to 
Rule is indeed a thorough-going critique of Eurocentric Marxism. It also directly 
addresses the need to ask (as Blaney and Tickner later describe their own agendaȌ Ǯhow the Ǯinternationalǯ has been enacted as a uni-verse and how the production of a Ǯone world worldǯ has worked to suppress myriad other life forms that are revealed in its very constitutionǯ ȋͺȌ. )ndeed, its central purpose is 
the recovery of the roles played by non-Western societies (from the Thirteenth 
Century CE onwards) in the historical processes that led to the emergence of 
capitalism and the rise of the West. And yet the anti-Eurocentric intellectual method used by Anievas and Nişancioğlu is none other than Ǯuneven and combined developmentǯ. (ow can this possibly be? 
 
The answer is that UCD is first and foremost a profound critique of the notion of 
stages (and hence also ladders) of development. Observing the effects of societal 
multiplicity and interaction, Trotsky rejected the idea that the struggle for 
freedom in Czarist Russia could succeed only by reproducing the trajectory of more Ǯadvancedǯ countries. On the contrary, unevenness and combination were 
creating a unique political sociology in Russia which, against all orthodox Marxist 
expectations, would generate anti-capitalist revolution there first, thus inverting the polarities of Ǯadvancedǯ and Ǯbackwardǯ. Or rather, Ǯ[t]he historical dialectic 
knows neither naked backwardness nor chemically pure progressiveness. It is all 
a question of concrete correlations.ǯx (And this did have the wider effect that 
Trotsky and his followers placed special emphasis on the political agency of 
colonial and Third World revolutions.) 
 ǮAhǯ, it will be said; Ǯbut this is still only an adjustment inside the 
developmentalist ideology of modernity. It does not challenge the overall 
teleology and Eurocentrism of Marxist thought which continues to see modernity 
as a grand narrative in which industrial capitalism radiates outwards from an originating West.ǯ Well, on the one hand, this is not so far from a post-colonial 
view which also defines modernity as a massive imposition of Western power 
onto the rest of the human world.xi It can hardly be a criticism of UCD that it 
records this same basic imbalance.  
 
But on the other hand, we might also probe Blaneyǯs and Ticknerǯs assumptions – 
so central to their overall argument – about the liabilities of Ǯdevelopmentǯ. ǮDevelopmentǯ, after all, is in the first instance simply a term that denotes 
cumulative change or eventuation over time. Societies may develop over time, 
perhaps becoming more organized, or culturally distinctive, or populous or 
powerful. But epidemics develop too, as the hosts and hence sources of infection 
proliferate. So do political crises, living organisms, art forms, ecosystems and so 
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on. Of course, the concrete meaning of Ǯdevelopmentǯ differs in all these different 
uses. What they share, however, is the property of cumulative causation of some 
kind leading to directional change. For the purpose of analysing such phenomena – and what social or biological entities do not experience change over time? – 
some concept of Ǯdevelopmentǯ is indispensable. If it did not exist, it would have 
to be invented.  
 )n the modern social sciences, however, Ǯdevelopmentǯ in this wide sense is all 
too easily conflated with a much more specific meaning: the particular forms of 
socio-historical change associated with industrial capitalism – the destruction of 
non-capitalist ways of life, the subordination of individuals and society to the 
impersonal laws of the market, the pursuit of Ǯprogressǯ via technological change and the accumulation of capital and so on. )n this sense, Ǯdevelopmentǯ, 
superimposed onto a world of difference, has long functioned as the legitimating 
ideology of Western supremacy – serving to mask the violent, hierarchical 
realities of colonial modernity. 
 
But is this – or need it be – the meaning of Ǯdevelopmentǯ in UCD? )t is here that  Aneivasǯ and Nişancioğluǯs extension of UCD into the deep historical past 
becomes so important. For the effect is necessarily to lift the idea away from any automatic association with the Ǯone world worldǯ of today, enabling us to find out 
once and for all whether its conception of Ǯdevelopmentǯ really is necessarily Ǯpart of the colonial/capitalist political and economic grammar and knowledge 
production central to and constitutive of cultural encounters as moments of violenceǯ ȋ͹Ȍ. Surveying their historical narrative, then, what do we find? 
 
We find, at the start, a late-medieval and Ǯearly modernǯ world of profoundly 
uneven development in which radically different forms of society coexisted – 
post-feudal Europe, Mongol nomads, Mughal India, Ming China, the Ottoman 
empire, African chiefdoms, Amerindian societies and so on. Human society was 
multiple, and social formations had developed – meaning they had grown up – 
differently in different places and at different times. (ere, Ǯunevennessǯ blocks 
any definition of development as a unitary phenomenon (Western or otherwise). 
And it enables us to see the world as both multiple and a single whole. Second, 
we find, (and this is the empirical argument of the book), that these social 
formations were everywhere in interaction with others; moreover, it was 
through a particular (geopolitical, mercantile and cultural) concatenation of 
interactions (Ǯcombined developmentǯ) that there eventually crystallized in 
North-Western Europe the kind of society we call industrial capitalism. Thus Ǯcombined developmentǯ is used to reveal what the unilinear, Eurocentric 
concept of development had concealed: the interactive participation of non-
European societies in a cumulative process of historical change. Third, the 
spatio-temporal unevenness of this historical process (producing 
industrialization in Europe before elsewhere) explains in turn the colonial 
encounter itself, through the drastic steepening of inter-societal inequalities of 
power that it temporarily produced. ǮColonial modernityǯ, then, is the outgrowth 
of a particular historical process of uneven and combined development. And 
finally, across the narrative as a whole, we also find that Anievasǯ and Nişancioğluǯs empirical argument reveals again and again the radical significance 
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of the international: for Marxism, for explanatory social theory, for World (istory accounts of the Ǯrise of the Westǯ and even ȋin the ConclusionȌ for 
conceptions and practices of political agency today. 
 
In short, when we release UCD from the time-bound context of its original formulation, this empties Ǯdevelopmentǯ of its modernist Eurocentric content; its further qualification of Ǯdevelopmentǯ as everywhere uneven and combined 
reveals the general significance of multiplicity, difference and interaction for the 
human world; and it thereby also pinpoints the unique potential contribution of 
IR to the social sciences and humanities. This is why I believe that UCD has a 
special role to play in springing IR from the prison of Political Science. Quite 
simply, no other theory places societal multiplicity at the heart of its analysis of 
social reality in this way.  
 
Still, in the end, it does not really matter whether we work with UCD, 
postcolonialism, Ǯencounters with differenceǯ, embodied theory or grand theory. 
What is important is that the long exile of IR at the margin of the social sciences 
should come to an end. If nothing else, the contributions to this forum have 
shown that the means to bring that about are gathering from many quarters. 
Surely the prison(s) cannot hold for much longer. 
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